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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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Office of the Executive Secretary

6 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence),  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Allan Evans, Deputy Director for Research,  
Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
[redacted] Chief of Staff,  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
[redacted] Deputy Assistant Director for  
Production, National Security Agency  
Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Board of National  
Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : State Department Comments Regarding Proposed  
National Intelligence Objectives Committee

The attached paper by Mr. Evans regarding "A Priority  
Committee - Arguments Pro and Con" is circulated for information  
and discussion at the next meeting of the PNIO Review Committee.

[redacted]  
Executive Secretary, USIB

Attachment

State Department review completed

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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April 29, 1963

Dear

Thinking over our last session, it occurred to me that it might be useful to put down the points we made in orderly fashion. I think I have covered the arguments that were presented; the fact that our contra statements come out pretty vigorously against the proposal will be no surprise to those who were at the meeting.

Sincerely,

*Allan*

Allan Evans  
Deputy Director for Research  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Attachment:

"A Priorities Committee -  
Arguments Pro and Con"  
(SECRET), Cys 1 & 2.

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Executive Secretary,  
United States Intelligence Board,  
Washington, D. C.

A National Intelligence Objectives Committee (NIOC) is needed because:

1. No one checks up on implementation of PNIOs

But: a - USIB has only to order the action agencies to report at some specific date or dates on what they have done or planned

b - Drafters of PNIOs could help by making clear where action is needed by identifying the changes in each new list

2. USIB could not needle the agencies or digest their reports

But: the community Coordinating Staff exists as an ideal center to perform this staff work for USIB

3. A GAP exists between the PNIO substantive level and present technical implementing collection organizations

But: a - This famous and much touted gap is a figment, because in each present organization (e.g., SIGINT Committee, NIS Committee, COMOR) the personnel deal day by day with substantive analysts in their own agencies, and the judgments they bring to the meetings combine estimative and technical considerations.

b - To the extent the technical groups operate out of touch with substance, it is the fault of the several agency heads, and should be discussed at USIB -- a NIOC would not cure this dangerous flaw.

c - Were NIOC to take up these several approaches, it would grow unwieldily large.

4. PNIOs should be kept up to date by some group

But: a - PNIOs are to have at least one year's validity (it was 3 to 5 years when we started). Thus PNIOs are not current intelligence indicators, and are not competing

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

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with Watch, CIB, etc., and do not require month to month or even quarter to quarter revision.

- b - In any case, PNIOs are not restrictive, and our intelligence structure has other means of meeting interim novelties -- notably the NIE procedures which have well proven their capability to deal with priority emergencies.
- c - The positive virtue of PNIOs is that they result from a comprehensive review of the total world situation; this overall review would get lost if PNIOs came to derive from a running and piecemeal concern with crises as they arise.
- d - The utility of PNIOs is generally seen as pointing (largely for budgetary planning purposes or post-factum justification) at large regional or even continental shifts of emphasis, and the number of items is being reduced, their scope generalized, accordingly. Continuous surveillance and modification conflict with this purpose, especially in that they would produce the same exhaustive detail and inclusiveness from which we are trying to escape.

5. Some center is required where all collection resources can be considered simultaneously

But: This center already exists in the CCPC. All we need is that USIB assign to CCPC for action the list of changes in priority which it accepts as valid when it approves each new PNIO list.

6. Rational allocation of assets and resources requires some central coordinating point

But: a - PNIOs do not pretend to deal with the full range of intelligence objectives and hence the full range of resources -- each list deals only with priority objectives, and for the community to limit its efforts to these objectives would produce catastrophe. What specific assets, then, would the NIOC have to play with? To determine the share of effort for which NIOC should feel responsible would occupy an army of lawyers for untold years and use up scads of the assets, time, and patience we should put on better things.

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b - If the intent (as clearly stated in the "Mission") is to review the total programs of the community, priority or otherwise, then we must seriously consider how this function may impinge upon the responsibilities of agency heads.

7. The powers proposed for NIOC are not really very extensive

But: Aside from the all-engrossing proposed "Mission" as above, the committee's function is specifically to "make recommendations to USIB regarding the practical implications of the .... PNIOs for national intelligence collection and production programs." Now, practical implications must mean action; collection and production programs mean everything we do (everything we do, incidentally; is "national," so no limitation resides in that word); and recommendations direct to USIB are words of power. It seems that the functions are indeed quite extensive and implement the mission in full.

*AE*  
INR/DDR:AEvans:th:4/29/63.

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2nd DRAFT -- TMN  
19 April 1963

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Comments on DD/I Memorandum Proposing Revision of PNIOs  
Dated 2 April 1963

I believe that the proposal put forward by the DD/I for revising the statement of Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives and of Priority National Intelligence Objectives is an important step forward in making these documents really significant and useful to the intelligence community. With one exception, the comments below are of relatively minor importance in the context of the improvements which should result from adoption of the DD/I's general proposals.

a. I am still concerned that the proposal does not give adequate recognition to certain continuing programs of the community which must be maintained under any peace-time circumstances. The NIS Program, which of course is specifically mentioned in the present CNIO, is perhaps an example. Additionally, there should be some recognition (as there is by implication in the Annex to the present DCID 3/1) that there will necessarily be intelligence programs in existence which do not bear any direct relationship to the listed Objectives.

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It is necessary to guard against the tendency to believe and to act, therefore, as if all the activities of the community should be directed solely in terms of the stated Comprehensive and Priority National Objectives. This tendency emerges even in the DD/I document itself.

b. I am puzzled by the inclusion of existing PNIO I.a. and II.a. both among the Comprehensive Objectives and the Priority Objectives. It would seem that these two statements belong only among the Comprehensive Objectives.

c. I believe that the creation of a continuing body - either as a formal USIB committee or otherwise - to review and revise regularly the Comprehensive and Priority Objectives is desirable. However, the mission of the committee as stated in the DD/I Memorandum is not only at variance with the alleged reason for creating the committee, but raises problems and difficulties over and above those inherent in determining and stating the Objectives. Responsibility for reviewing the plans and programs of the intelligence community has already been assigned to the Coordination Staff. Whether or not the Staff has done an effective job in the reviews it has made to date, it is clear that a committee will be in no position to do a better job. Indeed, considering the provenance of this proposal, I can not help but speculate that it represents an effort on the part of CIA to obtain control of this review function through its participation as secretariat and chairman of the proposed committee. I believe the other members of the Staff share the strength and vehemence of my opposition to the proposed statement of mission of the NIOC. I can

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visualize, however, that the committee might be of real practical assistance to the Coordination Staff in the latter's review function in that the committee might be in a position to identify "the practical implications of the CNIOs and PNIOs for national intelligence production and collection programs" which the Staff could take into account in reviewing plans and programs for consistency and proper allocation of effort.

d. My specific suggestions for changes in the proposed DCIDs are as follows:

DCID 1/2:

Change paragraph 1b. to read "... in any area in which US committments or interests are such ...."

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Add paragraph 1h. "Completion and maintenance of the basic intelligence required by approved National Intelligence Survey schedules."

DCID 1/3:

Paragraph 3., Delete "both to CNIOs and". This phrase somewhat confuses the distinction and relationship between CNIOs and PNIOs which paragraph 1. and 2. seek to express.

Delete Objectives A, 1, A and B.

DCID 1/- (National Intelligence Objectives Committee)

Change paragraph 2. Mission, to read: "The mission of the Committee shall be to recommend to USIB statements of Comprehensive

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and Priority National Intelligence Objectives to serve as guides for the coordination of intelligence collection and production responsive to the needs of national security policy."

Change paragraph 3(a). to read: "To inform the USIB regarding the practical implications of the CNIOs and PNIOs for national intelligence production and collection programs."

Change paragraph 3(c). to read: "To review and recommend to USIB revision or reaffirmation, as necessary on a semiannual basis, of the substance of CNIOs and PNIOs."

Delete paragraph 3(d).

Alter the order of the subparagraphs under paragraph 3., Functions, so that:

Present (b) becomes (a)  
Proposed (c) above becomes (b)  
Proposed (a) above becomes (c)



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7 March 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Comments on PNIOs

1. For whatever value they may have, I pass on to you the following thoughts concerning the PNIO problem.

Purpose of PNIOs

The current version of DCID No. 1/3 (PNIO) gives the following as the purpose of the PNIO lists:

- a. A guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production (para. 1).
- b. A stable basis for intelligence planning (para. 4).
- c. A basis for determining appropriate research and collection requirements (Annex, para. 1).
- d. The critical factors which require special attention and effort (Annex, para. 2).
- e. Guidance for planning the allocation of collection and research resources...but not constitute in themselves research and collection requirements (Annex, para. 4).

It is clear upon inspection that these stated purposes are inconsistent and in part contradictory. Similar inconsistency and contradiction is found in the list itself. To mention only a few examples:

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Item I.A. (early warning) has been with us as an intelligence problem since 1946, and probably will be with us in 2000. Item II.G. [REDACTED] did not exist in 1961 and may not exist in 1964. Item II.A. [REDACTED] is a real pious platitude virtually without meaning in terms of any of the alleged objectives of the PNIOs. Item II.E. [REDACTED] has been on the PNIO list for a number of years with, so far as I know, no real conclusions having ever been reached or in prospect. Numerous and varied additional strictures can be leveled at the present content of the PNIOs, including the fact that it has developed into something approaching a catalogue of miscellaneous intelligence problems.

2. It has been alleged that, despite their deficiencies, statements of PNIOs serve a useful purpose in providing direction and guidance to research and collection activities, and ensure that "national" intelligence objectives are not lost sight of in pursuit of "departmental" objectives. With respect to guidance to research and collection, it is noted that, based upon recollection and cursory check of agency contributions, there is no indication that any agency took seriously into account the PNIOs in developing its plans and programs for FY 1964. In particular, DD/P, which indicated certain changes in its program, did not refer to the PNIOs as a basis therefore. ORR's program statement is interesting in this regard.

<u>ORR Program Category</u>	<u>% of ORR Effort</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Related PNIO</u>
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3. In sum, I think the evidence is quite convincing that the PNIOs are not used to any significant degree as guidance in making decisions with respect to planning or allocating collection and research effort. They are used frequently to justify, post factum, decisions and plans which have been reached on quite other grounds. With respect to "national" vs. "departmental" objectives, it appears that, in many cases, the PNIOs have been deliberately used as a vehicle for obtaining recognition -- after a fashion -- for "departmental" objectives. In any case, there is no item in the present PNIO list which is not, in fact, also a departmental objective. And it is questionable whether there are any significant departmental objectives which are not included in the PNIO list.

4. It has sometimes been maintained that PNIOs can, or ought to, be used as the immediate source of requirements for collection. Insofar as requirements to be levied on existing collection facilities and assets are concerned, realistic requirements can only be arrived at after each specific problem has been examined and studied by the substantive experts, and after they have determined what information, not presently available, is essential to arriving at an intelligence solution or estimate. The point to be noted here is that the PNIO cannot be used as a basis for requirements until and unless a research component undertakes to do substantive work on the problem.

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A further point to be noted is that collection components have available to them other forms of guidance than requirements stemming indirectly from, and thus related to, PNIOs. The question of how a collection component uses its resources is, in the final analysis, a matter for the chief of the component to decide; in terms of the direction he receives from and his responsibilities to his superior. Neither the PNIOs nor the requirements related to them are substitutes for this command responsibility. I believe [ ] makes a similar point in the second paragraph of his memorandum of 25 February 1963. "Each member must determine the appropriate effort required by his Department or Agency in the light of its resources and capabilities as related to the intelligence deficiencies or gaps noted."

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5. The conclusion seems unavoidable that the PNIOs, in their present form, serve no useful purpose and should be discarded.

6. The question remains as to whether the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) should not provide some kind of guidance to the agencies in order to assist them in planning their activities and allocating their resources. In considering this question we must distinguish, I believe, two levels or types of planning which can be undertaken by an intelligence organization.

a. The first type is essentially short-range and consists in the determination as to how existing resources, with their existing capabilities and limitations, should be employed. For example, an intelligence research element can utilize its personnel to work on one or another of several areas of the world. This flexibility, however, is subject to severe limitations. Analysts competent in political science cannot profitably be redirected to produce intelligence on missiles or atomic energy. Similarly limited flexibility is to be found in collection components. These components can redirect their efforts within distinct limitations. For example, [ ]

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[ ] Thus, the first type of planning concerns, in effect, the use which can be made of assets and potentialities which exist here and now. For this type of planning, the semi-annual program of National Intelligence Estimates (prepared by the Board of National Estimates) may well provide the basis for useful guidance. This program does show the subjects and areas to which some collection and research resources must be devoted during the coming half year. There is, I believe, little doubt that this program does have an affect upon the use made of these assets. This type of guidance corresponds, to some extent, to Mr. Evans' I.a. "to serve directly

as a program guide for particular intelligence services and activities." To be useful for this type of guidance, the present ONE Program statement should perhaps be expanded to give some indication, for each estimate, of its scope and particular thrust or point of emphasis. This additional statement, of course, would not be "terms of reference" as currently understood.

b. The second type or level of planning relates to the making of basic changes in the size or capabilities of collection and research resources. For example, if it is determined that a significantly greater research effort must be devoted to Africa, it will be necessary to staff the research component concerned with analysts who are competent and knowledgeable of African matters. This cannot be done overnight and requires the time-consuming effort of recruitment, training, and reassignment of personnel. Similarly, with respect to a collection effort like that carried on by the military attache system, a major redirection such as increased emphasis on collection from Latin America requires major and time-consuming steps. So far as I am aware, no guidance exists with respect to this long-range type of planning which corresponds generally with Mr. Evans' I.b. "to give a general alert to the intelligence community on national intelligence goals" which would "...list not all topics requiring priority attention, but only major national intelligence goals, and particularly changes needed in the orientation of our intelligence effort." As Mr. Evans points out, such a listing would not by itself serve as direct guidance for programming collection or production, and further steps would be needed to translate broad topics into specific action proposals. These further steps must necessarily be taken by the Departments and Agencies which control research and collection facilities. The advice and coordinating facilities of various USIB committees could well be used in certain instances. The final results would emerge as changes in the programs of the agencies. The Coordination Staff, in connection with its review of plans and programs, is responsible for reviewing the plans of the agencies "for consistency and proper allocation of effort." The phrase "proper allocation of effort" can be construed as referring either to allocation in accordance with NSCIDs and DCIDs or to proper allocation in terms of actual intelligence needs as they are expected to exist during the fiscal year under consideration. In the reviews of plans and programs which it has undertaken, the Coordination Staff has actually used both these criteria. For example, in the review of fiscal year 1964 plans, the Staff recommendations were mainly concerned with proper allocation in accordance with existing directives.

The review of 1964 plans and programs undertaken by the Coordination Staff has been criticized, among other reasons, for the vague and

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imprecise nature of its recommendations. In the absence of any other concrete basis (except NSCIDs and DCIDs) to judge "proper allocation of effort" it is understandable that the review reached only limited and generalized conclusions. However, a long-range planning statement approved by USIB along the lines indicated above would provide a valuable guide to the Coordination Staff, enable it to review plans and programs against an agreed criterion, and to arrive at concrete conclusions and recommendations. These conclusions and recommendations would constitute a USIB "check up" on community action to attain agreed upon goals.

7. There may be another type of intelligence guidance which falls between the short-range and the long-range planning. This kind of guidance should relate to continuing intelligence problems for which no solution or resolution can be anticipated at any time in the future. Perhaps the word "planning" is a misnomer in this context. Rather, it is a question of USIB reminding the intelligence community that in both short-range and long-range planning it must keep in mind, and continue to make adequate provision for, these continuing problems:

8. It is suggested, therefore, that the PNIOs in their present form be eliminated. In place thereof, three separate but related types of guidance would be provided by the USIB.

a. Short-range guidance, based upon an expansion of the present schedule for National Estimates.

b. Long-range guidance, specifying anticipated major national intelligence goals requiring broad changes in the orientation or allocation of intelligence effort. These major goals should be anticipatory and forward looking, or, as [ ] may mean in his memorandum, "candidates for disaster." This guidance, while subject to annual review, would probably not change greatly from year to year.


c. Guidance as to continuing intelligence problems. This guidance also would tend to change very slowly, since it is a reminder list and would encompass many of the relatively permanent items in the category I. of the present PNIOs.

9. In further development of these suggestions, it may be feasible for certain USIB committees, or ad hoc groups called together for the purpose, to develop further guidance statements on an area basis, derived in the main from a. and b. above, but including other area problems of outstanding importance. Such supplementary guidance would attempt also to identify within each stated problem those specific elements that should be further examined for particular collection effort.

10. It should be emphasized that no revamping of the PNIOs, or the adoption of the suggestions outlined above, will eliminate the necessity for the following two principles:

a. Continuing responsibility on the part of chiefs of collection and research components for decisions as to the nature and direction of their activities.

b. The continuous development of specific requirements by research elements as an integral part of the process of intelligence analysis. There can be no substitution or short-cut for these two principles.



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